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Abstract 
Business as usual is widely acknowledged as the main driver of ecological 
collapse and climate breakdown, but less attention is paid to the role of law as usual as 
an impediment to climate justice. This article analyses how domestic and international 
environmental law facilitate injustices against living entities and nature. It calls for a 
paradigm shift in legal theory, practice and teaching to reflect the scale and urgency of 
the unfolding ecological catastrophe. Section 2 outlines the links between climatic harms 
and climate injustices. This is followed by discussions of unsustainable law and 
economic development in sections 3 and 4. Section 5 examines the potential contribution 
of new materialist legal theory in bringing about a legal paradigm shift that reflects the 
jurisgenerative role of nature in promoting climate justice. 
Key words 
Anthropocene; global heating; climate emergency; climate justice; climatic 
harms; paradigm shift; new materialism 
Resumen 
El curso normal de la actividad empresarial está ampliamente considerado como 
el actor principal del colapso ecológico y el desastre climático, pero se presta menos 
atención al papel del curso normal del derecho como obstáculo a la justicia climática. 
Este artículo analiza cómo el derecho ambiental nacional e internacional  facilita que se 
produzcan injusticias contra los seres vivos y la naturaleza. Pide un cambio de 
paradigma en la teoría, la práctica y la enseñanza del derecho, para reflejar la escala y la 
urgencia de la catástrofe ecológica que se está desarrollando. La sección 2 dibuja las 
relaciones entre el daño climático y la injusticia climática. A esto le sigue una 
argumentación sobre el desarrollo jurídico y económico insostenible, en las secciones 3 
y 4. La sección 5 examina la contribución potencial de la nueva teoría jurídica 
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materialista en el sentido de provocar un cambio de paradigma jurídico que refleje el rol 
jurisgenerativo de la naturaleza para promover la justicia climática. 
Palabras clave 
Antropoceno; calentamiento global; emergencia climática; justicia climática; 
daño climático; cambio de paradigma; nuevo materialismo 
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1. Introduction 
The Greek word krisis refers to a decisive turning point arising from dysfunctional social, 
political, economic and legal relations that facilitate and perpetuate injustices and 
impede fundamental systemic transformation.1 In Antonio Gramsci’s words, the “crisis 
consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new is yet to be born. And in 
the interregnum, a great variety of morbid symptoms appear” (Gramsci 1971, 276). 
Intensifying climatic harms, persistent poverty and growing inequality are amongst the 
morbid systems of the unfolding climate and ecological catastrophe.2 Nine planetary 
boundaries have been breached or are under threat (Rockström et al. 2009, Hickel 2019).3 
The limitations of international environmental law (IEL) and the climate regime increase 
the difficulty of finding solutions to climate breakdown. This is reflected in the gap 
between ecological sustainability and the hortatory and voluntarist provisions of the 
Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals.4 With global heating locked 
in, we have entered climate triage, in which we are confronted with agonising decisions 
about who treat with the limited resources available. Despite its limitations, law can play 
an important role in ameliorating climatic harms, protecting human rights, and seeking 
distributive, reparative and climate justice for the poor and vulnerable in current and 
future generations who are least responsible for but most at risk in the climate 
emergency. 
The progressive contribution that law can make is enhanced to the extent that it is 
aligned with Earth System science and the lessons of the Anthropocene: the rupture to 
the Earth System caused by human activity (Hamilton 2016, at 94).5 In 2002, Nobel 
chemistry laureate Paul Crutzen argued that “[i]t seems appropriate to assign the term 
‘Anthropocene’ to the present, in many ways human-dominated, geological epoch” 
(Crutzen 2002, 23-23).6 Anthropogenic ecological destruction intensified during the 
Great Acceleration: 
                                                 
1 Isabelle Stengers (2015b, p. 47) distinguishes catastrophe from crisis in that the former designates a crisis 
from which there is no recovery. As she argues, in the Anthropocene there is no future in which nature can 
return to being merely the environment. 
2 These symptoms and their implications are identified in the warnings of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) and Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem 
Services (IPBES) (First et al. 2018, Brondizio et al. 2019). 
3 Four boundaries have now been crossed: climate change, loss of biosphere integrity, land-system change, 
altered biogeochemical cycles (phosphorus and nitrogen). The remainder are under threat: stratospheric 
ozone depletion, ocean acidification; freshwater use, atmospheric aerosol loading, introduction of novel 
entities (e.g. radioactive materials and microplastics). Available from: 
https://www.su.se/english/about/news-and-events/press/press-releases/four-of-nine-planetary-
boundaries-now-crossed-1.218003 [Accessed 8 May 2020]. 
4 Current Nationally Determined Contributions pledges by parties to the Paris agreement are likely to lead 
to a global temperature rise of about 3.2oC by the end of the century. To prevent an increase of more than 
1.5 oC by 2030, emissions must fall by 7.6 per cent every year (United Nations Environment Programme – 
UNEP – 2019). 
5 Hamilton describes Earth System as an “integrative meta-science of the whole planet as a unified, complex, 
evolving system beyond the sum of its parts.” 
6 In 2000, Crutzen and Eugene Stoermer had introduced the concept in the newsletter for the International 
Geosphere-Biosphere Programme in which they described the ways in which mankind had become a 
“significant geological, morphological force” (Crutzen and Stoerner 2000, 17-18). “Capitalocene” is a more 
appropriate term that highlights the central role of capital accumulation, especially growth, as the main 
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The second half of the twentieth century is unique in the entire history of human 
existence on Earth. Many human activities reached take-off points sometime in the 
twentieth century and have accelerated sharply towards the end of the century. The last 
50 years have without doubt seen the most rapid transformation of the human 
relationship with the natural world in the history of humankind. (Steffen et al. 2005, 131; 
see also Steffen et al. 2015, 81-98) 
The resulting conflation of human and geological history has been legally disruptive 
(Fisher et al. 2017) and poses fundamental challenges to liberal law and theories of justice. 
Ecological modernisers evangelise about a “good Anthropocene” in which global 
climate is engineered to enable them to pursue endless growth and profit (Shellenberger 
and Nordhaus 2015) through some version of the oxymoronic delusion of sustainable 
development (Adelman 2018).7 Growth fetishism and extractivism are so deeply 
hardwired into contemporary models of development that it is difficult to envisage how 
ecological sustainability can be achieved under capitalism (Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016). 
In nature, uncontrolled growth is cancerous, yet credit, debt, interest and rent – all 
predicated upon continuous expansion of capital – are hardwired into legal systems. It 
is not necessary to resort to crude reductionism to identify the ways in which law as 
usual promotes business as usual (Pistor 2019) and thereby creates impediments to 
ecological sustainability and climate justice. As Jameson (2003, 76) observes, it is easier 
to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. 
2. Climatic Harms and Climate Injustice 
A theory of climate justice must provide criteria for determining who owes what to 
whom and why, and how these obligations should be discharged. It must encompass 
and extend existing strands of environmental, distributive, gender, global, procedural 
and reparative justice. Three criteria for climate justice are commonly advanced in 
various combinations: historical responsibility, benefit, and ability to pay. All are 
problematic to varying degrees because justice is complicated (Moellendorf 2012, Moss 
2015), but they provide a coherent basis for giving effect to the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC), which has been the 
most contentious and divisive issue in the UNFCCC (Atapattu 2016) because ascribing 
responsibility for climate breakdown and the national obligations that ensue go to the 
heart of climate justice. It is a basic tenet of justice that those who harm others have a 
duty to correct or repair the harm – to the extent that this is possible under global 
heating. Large historical emitters have proportionately greater obligations to assist 
poorer countries despite the fast-growing emissions of rapidly industrialising countries. 
This is justifiable because there is a close correlation between historical emissions, the 
benefits derived from carbon-based industrialisation, and the wealth and ability to 
provide financial and other resources to less developed countries for adaptation, 
mitigation and climatic loss and damage. 
Countries with the greatest historical responsibility are likely to have derived benefits 
that are tangible and intangible, including sophisticated infrastructure, high standards 
of living, intellectual property and state of the art technologies, and relatively strong 
                                                 
driver of ecological destruction. I use “the Anthropocene” because it is a concept now widely used in 
academic and public discourse. 
7 On the bizarreness of a good Anthropocene, see Hamilton 2015. 
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adaptive capacities. In turn, the beneficiary principle underpins the ability to pay 
principle. The wealth accrued through carbon-based industrialisation obliges developed 
countries to transfer financial and other resources to less developed countries require for 
adaptation, mitigation and loss and damage from climatic harms. Assistance in kind 
includes a right to relocation and resettlement for citizens of small island developing 
states threatened by rising sea levels and other victims of slow and rapid onset climatic 
harms. 
2. Unsustainable Law 
If business as usual is the main driver of environmental collapse and the spread of 
zoonotic viruses, law as usual is its able abettor.8 By protecting property (both private 
and sovereign) and polluters more than the planet, legal systems have historically 
legitimised and naturalised ecological destruction (Adelman forthcoming 2020). IEL is 
too often hortatory, voluntarist and unenforceable. As a consequence, the link between 
law and climate justice is often tenuous or non-existent, especially when law is 
antithetical to a safe, healthy, ecologically sustainable environment that is a precondition 
for all forms of justice. 
Law’s content – its rules and doctrine – and its form create substantial obstacles to 
sustainability (Grear 2015). This has generated a growing wave of critiques of IEL’s 
ineffectiveness, lack of normative ambition and misalignment with Earth System science 
(French and Kotzé 2019, Kotzé 2019). Critical scholars and innovative practitioners are 
seeking ways of overcoming impediments that are deeply entrenched in the law.9 Law 
is a central part of the problem but also potentially part of the solution if we are able to 
exploit its many contradictions to close the gap between what it promises and delivers. 
This requires more than effective legislation and enforcement; it requires a paradigm 
shift in ways we think about, teach and practice law. 
Signatories to multilateral environmental agreements could take a meaningful step 
towards climate justice by giving effect to the precautionary, polluter pays and other 
core principles of IEL, not least giving substance to common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC) so that states with the greatest 
historical responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions discharge their ecological debts to 
the global South. The Paris Agreement is binding but unenforceable in relation to 
emissions and climate finance, and the SDGs lack both resources and means of 
enforcement. Taking IEL seriously requires the Warsaw International Mechanism for 
Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts to become a channel for 
compensation and reparative justice rather than a technocratic, depoliticised neoliberal, 
insurance-based mechanism. In short, a precondition for climate justice is closing the 
gap between exhortation and effectiveness so that polluters pay and precaution trumps 
profit. 
Law’s default position is the defence of private property owners and sovereigns; it is 
therefore generally inimical to ecologically sustainable forms of governance such as 
                                                 
8 On growth fetishism, see Hamilton 2003 and Fioramonti 2013. On zoonotic transmission of viruses, see 
Kaplan 2020. 
9 In relation to climate litigation these include causation, jurisdiction, standing, and the costs and length of 
litigation (International Bar Association – IBA – 2020, ch. III). 
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commons (Grear 2012). Company law limits corporate liability, prioritises the interests 
of shareholders over other stakeholders including the wider public, and promotes profit 
and short-termism over sustainability and climate justice. Generations of law students 
have been inculcated with the belief that ecological destruction is an inevitable by-
product of law’s logic and Hayekian catallaxy rather than human choice (Hayek 1978). 
Grear (2014) argues that the Anthropocene is both an ecological crisis and a crisis of 
hierarchy signified by the existential divide between those with access to law and climate 
justice and the majority with none. 
To close this divide, law must address the axiological, onto-epistemological and ethical 
challenges of the Anthropocene that flow from climatic material harms. Modern Western 
law is replete with Cartesian dualisms, hierarchies, and the bordered, exclusionary 
tropes of Eurocentric rationality (Grear 2014).10 To this end, law must overcome the deep 
anthropocentrism that scars it without lapsing into an equally sterile form of ecocentrism 
in order to reflect the co-dependence of humans, ecosystems and other species. As Voigt 
observes: 
There have been attempts to extend the liberal theory of justice to humans’ relationship 
with the inanimate world, even to the biosphere as such. But justice in this sense is 
generally not concerned about responsibility for – let alone the direct rights and 
interests of – the planet. Rather, the preservation of the earth in a healthy state is seen 
as primarily and instrumentally essential for the future life of humans. A duty towards 
the planet as such is, in this context, an indirect one; the direct duty being towards 
future people. (Voigt 2005, pp. 123-124) 
Paradoxically, law must therefore decentre humanity at the same time even as it 
acknowledges their hyper-agency and telluric power by imposing new forms of 
responsibilisation and response-ability.11 
Law is depicted as neutral, objective and impartial, but scratching its carapace exposes 
its foundational myths and the vices of formalism, positivism and mechanistic 
jurisprudence (Capra and Mattei 2015). Combining Baconian and Cartesian elements, 
law treats nature as set of objects to be tamed in the pursuit of growth and profit through 
epistemologies and technologies of mastery (Code 2006, Adelman 2015). The nature-
society dualism is antithetical to climate justice, which is contingent upon a healthy 
biosphere. It is reductionist in that it reduces ecological destruction to discrete 
environmental harms susceptible to technocratic, depoliticised “solutions” rather than 
interconnected parts of a common biosphere. It is hierarchical and exclusionary because 
it subordinates and others nature. It promotes an instrumentalist and mechanistic view 
of nature that deeply penetrates the law. Law’s complicity in the death of nature 
produced by Western science produces (Merchant 1998) accounts for the difficulty of 
incorporating Earth System science into IEL. Throughout modernity, law has treated 
nature as inert rather than the location of the interactions of multiple agents with varying 
                                                 
10 Timothy Morton (2013) describes global heating as a hyperobject, a human-nonhuman assemblage so 
massively distributed in time and space that it transcends spatiotemporal specificity and whose local 
manifestations cannot reveal its totality. 
11 For Donna Haraway (2008), response-ability is the ability of humans and animals to interact and respond 
to each other in bodily, physical ways. It is fundamental to animal-human relationality and notions of what 
is just and unjust. 
Adelman    
8 
degrees of consciousness whose agency perpetually inflects the law. Law elides nature’s 
agency. 
The danger implicit in the Anthropocene is that highlighting the consequences of human 
hyper-agency perversely strengthens tropes of Promethean human exceptionalism 
increasingly powerless in the face of nature that was presumed to have been tamed. 
Human beings remain at the centre of environments from which they are radically 
separated, reinforcing the Cartesian divide between nature and society that must be 
bridged as a precondition for sustainability and climate justice. Anthropos is thus 
portrayed as an increasingly disempowered hyper-agent. This paradox arises from 
mechanistic Baconian conceptions of nature and epistemologies of master and 
domination deeply rooted in law (Adelman 2015). 
Discourses of closure, silencing and exclusion were foundational to modern Western 
law. In this it reflects the construction of European identity as the inverse of the excluded 
Other (Fitzpatrick 2002, Santos 2002). Those deemed to lack the rationality of 
autonomous Kantian subjects were excluded from full legal personhood, and nature’s 
supposed inertness and lack of agency relegated it to the bottom of an anthropocentric 
hierarchy, below blacks, slaves and women. As numerous ecofeminists have argued, 
disembodiment is a core aspect of liberal legalism symbolised by abstract legal 
personhood apotheosised in the corporate form. Anna Grear (2018, p. 132) argues that 
ecologically destructive activities, especially those of corporations, are underpinned by 
“‘a philosophy (and a politics) of disembodiment intrinsically connected to reason and its 
privileged subject”. Val Plumwood and Lorrain Code emphasise the significance of 
embeddedness, situatedness, re-embodying the self, and the importance of reconnecting 
law to corporeal beings.12 Amongst law’s contradictions is its facility of endowing 
disembodied actors such as corporations with agency and rights while them to living 
entities – the victims on the other side of the Anthropocene-Capitalocene abyss who have 
rights they cannot use. Grear  writes that “the entire history of the modern subject is 
precisely that of a knowing, separative agent who acts upon ‘nature’ (now reduced to ‘the 
environment’) as a passive backdrop to the only real action that counts – the exercise of 
‘human’ (rational) agency” (Grear 2017b, p. 7; emphases in original). The abstract legal 
person is a decontextualized subject largely ignorant of the extent to which his agency is 
contingent upon that of non-human actants. This leads Davies to contend that law must 
be “rehabilitated from the sphere of abstract rationality to a spatial, material, and 
embodied existence” (Davies 2017, p. 106). It seems clear that the climate is not merely 
an object of negotiation and techno-scientific management in the UNFCCC but the 
central actant. 
How should we understand the legal agency of a nature inextricably entangled with 
human activities in geohistory? A nature comprised of hundreds of thousands of “sub-
agents” such as rising sea levels, tropical storms and biota? A necessary precondition is 
to eschew the nature-culture dualism in favour of the concept of natureculture. Bruno 
Latour maintains that the conception of nature that emerges from the Cartesian binary 
                                                 
12 Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (2010, p. 1) rhetorically ask how can we be anything other than 
materialists in light of the “massive materiality” that comprises our embodied condition as human animals 
embedded in assemblages of dependencies and relations with other species and forms of matter? See also 
Plumwood (1993) and Code (2006). 
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is so contrived that “political ecology has nothing to do with nature” (Latour 2004, p. 5; 
emphasis in original). It underpins the Modernist Constitution that based upon an 
ontological split between society and nature which is refuted by the real history of 
Western societies – the interaction of purification and hybridisation (Wood 2018, p. 99). 
Purification involves the separation of the human world from the world of things and 
the construction of nature as a separate entity. Nature is then treated as a domain of 
mechanistic or biological causality whereas culture/society is an autonomous domain of 
linguistic or social constructivism free from nature’s determinism. Nature is turned into 
the environment, the place “over there” that surrounds us but does not determine our 
destiny. Since nature and society cannot be severed, the West has never been “modern” 
(Latour 1993) and the social world has never been pure because it is ineluctably a realm 
of hybridisation and networks in which non-human matter is an actant (Latour 2009).13 
The scale of the problem is demonstrated by the history modern Western law, which 
was constructed upon Cartesian division of nature and society. The progenitors of 
international law rationalised colonial appropriation and expropriation through the 
myth of terrae nullius and generated a system of rules designed to legitimise unequal 
ecological exchange (Anghie 2007, Adelman 2017b, Linarelli et al. 2018).14 IEL has always 
been more concerned with regulating accumulation than achieving sustainability: 
polluters rarely pay the full social costs of their harms, countries regularly violate the 
no-harm rule, the precautionary principle appears to be inapplicable to greenhouse gas 
emissions; and sustainable development has been sustainably unfriendly to the 
environment (Adelman 2018). At the very least, taking IEL seriously requires states and 
courts to make its rules, norms and principles effective and enforceable – a Sisyphean 
task made more difficult by the sovereign exceptionalism that characterises the 
dysfunctionality of contemporary global governance. IEL has never come close to 
resolving the contradiction between territorially bounded Westphalian rationality and 
the transboundary nature of global capital and global heating. In the hands of Bolsonaro 
and Trump, the right to permanent sovereignty over natural resources provides 
immunity and impunity (Hope 2019) as law is deployed as weapon of mass 
environmental destruction. 
We are thus confronted with the paradox of having too much law that achieves too little 
but requiring it when it does not exist – a problem highlighted by the proliferation of 
human rights.15 Law appears to be indispensable despite or, perhaps more accurately, 
precisely because of its inadequacies. We thus find ourselves in a Catch-22 predicament 
in which both the presence and absence of law is inimical to ecological sustainability and 
to climate justice. The millions who will be displaced by global heating currently have 
little protection under international law refugee law and international human rights law 
                                                 
13 In Latour’s Actor Network Theory (ANT), agency may be attributed to any object or “actant” constituted 
in an assemblage or web of materially heterogenous relations. Latour (2009) praises James Lovelock’s 
understanding of the interrelationships between human and other that living beings in his conception of 
Gaia. See also Stengers 2015a. 
14 On unequal ecological exchange see Roberts and Parks 2009, Hornborg 2011 and Gonzalez 2021 (in this 
issue). 
15 Giorgio Agamben (1998, 2005) demonstrated the legalisation of lawlessness in states of exception through 
the inclusion of individuals in law in order to exclude them from it. Climate breakdown is a global state of 
exception in which the law applies in its inapplicability. 
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(McAdam 2010, 2011) and there is little prospect of that a dedicated international 
instrument.16 The Paris Agreement is a distillation of these contradictions. It is binding 
but voluntary; human rights are included but confined to the preamble; article 5 
addresses deforestation without stopping it; and article 8 recognises loss and damage 
but provides no right to compensation or to relocation and resettlement – a necessity for 
small island developing states threatened by rising sea levels.17 The Agreement is not a 
charter for climate justice – as Walter Benjamin (1968, p. 258) observed, “[t]here is no 
document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism”.18 
Climate justice depends upon law designed to hold states and corporations accountable 
for pollution and rights violations and its enforcement by courts willing to acknowledge 
public alarm about global heating. A wide range of law is being deployed in climate 
litigation, including include multilateral environmental agreements, constitutional and 
human rights law, tort and public trust doctrine (Setzer and Byrnes 2019, Setzer and 
Vanhala 2019). Landmark decisions such as Ashgar Leghari (2015) Urgenda (2019) and the 
Heathrow runway case (R v Secretary of State and others, 2019) suggest that courts can be 
swayed by rights-based arguments and to give efficacy to the Paris Agreement. The 2017 
Advisory Opinion of Inter-American Court of Human Rights demonstrated a 
willingness to extend the scope of IEL. Urgenda and the Heathrow case indicate that the 
Paris Agreement may be more enforceable than its voluntarist structure suggests. 
In Urgenda, the Netherlands Supreme Court held that the no harm rule imposes a duty 
on states to prevent climatic harms. It decided that reducing emissions is a common but 
differentiated responsibility that cannot be evaded by pointing to the failure of other 
countries. Since “partial causation justifies partial responsibility” even small reductions 
in national emissions should not be regarded as negligible.19 In the Heathrow case, the 
High Court decided that environmental impact assessments must encompass to climate 
change obligations under the Paris Agreement.20 These cases may be positive portends 
for climate justice through a willingness to take IEL seriously, but Urgenda took seven 
years to decide and we are running out of time. According to the IPCC we have less than 
a decade to prevent global temperature from increasing by more than 1.5oC above 
preindustrial levels (Zhai et al. 2018). 
As our climate breaks down, there will be more significant decisions that narrow the 
mismatch between what IEL promises and what it delivers, between sustainable 
development and ecological sustainability. Climate justice will not be achieved on a 
                                                 
16 A potentially positive development is contained in the finding by the UN Human Rights Committee that 
countries cannot deport people who seek asylum due to climate-related threats (UN Human Rights 
Committee 2020). 
17 Paragraph 52 of the Paris Decision enacting the Paris Agreement explicitly excludes liability and 
compensation for loss and damage at the behest of developed countries seeking to closing routes to 
reparative justice in domestic courts. 
18 The preamble, in language verging upon the contemptuous, notes “the importance for some of the concept 
of “climate justice”, when taking action to address climate change” (emphasis added). 
19 It is possible that this decision may form the basis for proportional liability and compensation by the 
Netherlands for climatic harms such as loss and damage even though the case concerned injunctive relief 
rather than damages (Nollkaemper and Burgers 2020).  
20 See also the Thabametsi case in South Africa: Earthlife Africa Johannesburg v Minister of Environmental Affairs 
& Others (2017). 
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piecemeal basis but only through a thoroughgoing onto-epistemological paradigm shift 
that reflects the scale and urgency of the Anthropocene-Capitalocene. 
3. Un-Sustainable Development 
Sustainable development became a core component of IEL with the Brundtland 
Commission’s report to the World Conference on Environment and Development in 
1987 (WCED 1987). Our Common Future argued that endless economic growth in pursuit 
of social justice is compatible with a healthy environment, the so-called triple bottom 
line. The Brundtland definition – “Sustainable development is development that meets 
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs” (WCED 1987, p. 43) – is the predominant concept of development 
despite sustained critique by postdevelopment scholars (Sachs 1992, Escobar 2011). The 
problem is that mainstream models of development – “one of the oldest and most 
powerful of all Western ideas” (Hettne 1995, p. 29) – have always been predicated upon 
extractive economic growth that is intrinsically destructive of the environment. Eduardo 
Gudynas (2011) argues that the development has repeatedly been declared dead but 
staggers on in zombie forms. Neoliberal globalisation has trade and primary engine of 
growth and development, whereas climate justice requires a Grundnorm of ecological 
sustainability as the yardstick by which economic activity is measured. 
The likelihood that the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) can be will be achieved 
during the next decade is small, not least because the unenforceable and under-
resourced.21 As Hamilton (2003, p. 184) writes, “[t]he development mentality is the daily 
manifestation of growth fetishism”. Law may not be a direct driver of unsustainability 
but does little to impede it. 
If development is the problem it is inconceivable how alternative forms of development 
can offer a solution. This is the central insight offered by proponents of alternatives to 
development such varieties of buen vivir (living well) based upon Andean cosmovisions 
that promote modes of living not defined by Eurocentric notions of growth and progress 
– pluralistic onto-epistemologies which reject the instrumentalisation and 
commodification of social life and nature (Gudynas 2016, pp. 727-728), and accept the 
agency of non-human entities and the co-dependence of humans and nature. They 
promote a communitarian ethos based upon harmony with nature and respect for 
Pachamama (Mother Earth) as the source of life (Acosta 2010, Acosta and Gudynas 2011) 
because the wellbeing of humans, other species and nature is indivisible. Buen vivir “calls 
for a ‘biocentric’ understanding of life in which Nature has rights of its own and an 
intrinsic significance regardless of its value for human life” (Ramírez 2010, p. 24); as such, 
it is intrinsically oriented towards climate justice for all species and the planet. Buen vivir 
and the rights of nature have been incorporated into the constitutions of Ecuador (2008) 
and Bolivia (2009),22 albeit with contradictory results. Buen vivir is not a simple, ready-
                                                 
21 The IPCC (First et al. 2018, p. 44) drily observes that sustainable development “will be exceedingly difficult, 
if not imposible” without “societal transformation and rapid implementation of ambitious greenhouse gas 
reduction measures”. 
22 The Ecuadorian Constitution (2008) guarantees the rights of buen vivir (articles 12–34) and grants rights to 
nature (articles 71–74). In Bolivia, buen vivir informs the 2009 Constitution, which does not grant rights to 
nature. However, Pachamama is protected under the Law of the Rights of Mother Earth (Law 071 of the 
Plurinational State) passed by the Plurinational Legislative Assembly on 21 December 2010 (Nuñez 2019). 
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made alternative to Western forms of development (Ramírez–Cendrero 2017); rather, it 
offers alternative ways of being, seeing and knowing – epistemologies of humility – that 
treat nature as a partner rather than a threat, as a living entity rather than the mere 
surround for human exceptionalism implied by Eurocentric notions of environment.23 
4. Towards a Paradigm Shift 
Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos calls for a critical environmental law that “exerts 
a radical critique of traditional legal and ecological foundations, while proposing in their 
stead a new, mobile, material and acentric environmental legal approach” in an open 
ecology that “combines the natural, the human, the artificial, the legal, the scientific, the 
political, the economic and so on, on a plane of contingency and fluid boundaries” 
(Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2015, p. 57). He calls for a: 
radical theoretical reconfiguration of environmental law, one that will no longer rely on the 
old semantics of environment as resource, of the human as centre, of the logocentric 
idolisation of public participation, of illusionary discursive consensus, of causality 
proven and best means measured. Only a radical rethinking that will distance itself 
from the above and live up to the challenge of environmental degradation will bring 
the kind of environmental action that is required, targeting the root rather than the 
symptom and assisting environmental law in its crystallisation as a truly radical legal 
discipline. (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos 2011, p. 25; emphasis in original) 
Earth jurisprudence (also known as Wild Law) aspires to such a radical reconfiguration. 
It correctly identifies private property as a fundamental impediment to ecological 
sustainability and aims to supplant anthropocentrism with a radical ecocentrism 
(Cullinan 2011, Burdon 2015, Howe 2017).24 Cormac Cullinan argues that all beings have 
fundamental rights, including “the right to exist, to a habitat or a place to be and to 
participate in the evolution of the Earth community” (Cullinan 2011, p. 13). Earth 
jurisprudence argues that all living entities are entitled to rights and respect (Magallanes 
2015, Kaufmann and Martin 2017, Cano Pecharroman 2018). Nearly fifty years after 
Christopher Stone asked why trees should not have rights (Stone 1972), countries as 
disparate as Colombia and New Zealand have demonstrated that there is no doctrinal 
impediment to legal protection for rivers (Krämer 2020). 
To state the obvious, nature has always shaped the form and content of law, particularly 
through the commodification of nature as private and sovereign property. International 
law originated in rules designed to legitimate the appropriation of natural resources and 
unequal ecological exchange. But nature has been treated as a backdrop rather than an 
actor – as environment. Paradoxically, nature’s influence increases when its agency is 
denied. Global heating increasingly shapes the US legal system through its absence; no 
other government is so obsessed about a problem whose existence it denies. 
The rupture to the Earth system in the Anthropocene is law’s defining feature. It disrupts 
all bodies of law from property, company, tort and criminal law to environmental law. 
Climate breakdown exposes the gap between Earth system governance and neoliberal 
                                                 
23 I have chosen to focus on Andean cosmovisions but there is a growing literature on other approaches such 
as degrowth (see the contributions to Capitalism Nature Socialism 30(2), (Engel-Di Mauro 2019), steady state 
economics and the Green New Deal (Pettifor 2019). 
24 This risks creating an inverted nature-society dualism that I address below. 
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globalisation and between liberal legality and the holistic, systemic thinking needed to 
deal with the crisis. Actants (Latour 2009) and assemblages (Deleuze and Guattari 1988) 
such as rising temperatures and sea levels, warming oceans, tropical storms, wildfires 
and zoonotically transmitted coronaviruses possess greater agential, jurisgenerative 
power than legal theorists are generally willing to acknowledge.25 As Coole and Frost 
(2010, p. 9) argue, “materiality is always something more than ‘mere’ matter: an excess, 
force, vitality, relationality, or difference that renders matter active, self-creative, 
productive, unpredictable”. The facticity of inter-relational, entangled corporeality has 
always shaped law but rarely been acknowledge. 
A central paradox of the Anthropocene is the growing powerlessness of human hyper-
agents in the face of nature’s agency. For some, the solution is to extend this hyper-
agency through new technologies designed fix the problems caused by humanity’s 
experiment with the climate (Hamilton 2017) such as geoengineering (Adelman 2017a). 
Indigenous people have always understood that violence perpetrated against nature 
would provoke consequences beyond human control. 
Arguing that the Anthropocene compels us to abandon the sovereign-centric mental 
cartographies of the global and the local, Bruno Latour identifies the Terrestrial as both 
a new condition and the site of law and politics in the New Climatic Regime.26 The 
“Terrestrial is bound to the earth and to land, but it is also a way of worlding, in that it 
aligns with no borders, transcends all identities” (Latour 2018, p. 54; emphasis in 
original). It is less a framework for human action than a new political actor with effects 
on law and justice that cannot be ignored (Ibid, p. 42). The Terrestrial indicates the need 
for fundamentally new ways of understanding the human condition as inextricably 
linked to the fate of the biosphere and biodiversity; it “is literally drawing another world, 
as different from “nature” as from what used to be called the ‘human world’ or ‘society’” 
(Latour 2018, p. 80). 
Latour argues that the only way to reconnect the social and the ecological is through a 
system of engendering that: 
brings into confrontation agents, actors, animate beings that all have distinct capacities 
for reacting. It does not proceed from the same conception of materiality as the system 
of production, it does not lead to the same epistemology, and it does not lead to the 
same form of politics. It is not interested in producing goods, for humans, on the basis 
of resources, but in engendering terrestrials – not just humans but all terrestrials. (Latour 
2018, pp. 82-83; emphasis in original) 
The New Climatic Regime requires us to focus on the geo-social impacts of human activity 
and the social agency of nature and entails a paradigm shift from understanding 
“nature-as-universe” to “nature-as-process”. This paradigm shift must extend to law 
and reflect new materialist approaches to post-anthropocentric, posthuman agency and 
subjectivity in the Anthropocene. 
                                                 
25 Jurisgenerative refers to “the law’s capacity to create a normative universe of meaning which can often 
escape the ‘provenance of formal lawmaking’” (Benhabib 2011, p. 125). 
26 Latour contends that we must reject both the Global, the end point of the discredited project of modernity, 
and the Local, the fall-back position of critics of globalism. Those “who continue to flee toward the Global 
and those who continue to take refuge in the Local” fail to comprehend the scale of change in the geo-human 
history of the Anthropocene (Latour 2018, p. 51).  
Adelman    
14 
4.1. New Materialism 
In Connolly’s view (2011, p. 31), “the biggest mistake by theories of exclusive human 
agency is to constitute the rest of the world as if it were a set of mere objects”. Materiality 
is not merely the matter that surrounds human activity, it has agentic capacities and 
effectivity (Bennett 2010, p. ix). As Coole and Frost (2010, pp. 3-4) argue, what is 
therefore at stake in new materialism is: 
nothing less than a challenge to some of the most basic assumptions that have 
underpinned the modern world, including its normative sense of the human and its 
beliefs about human agency, [and] (…) its material practices such as the ways we 
labour on, exploit and interact with nature. 
New materialism thinking reveals the ways in which climate justice is linked to 
ontological knowledge derived from human corporeality, situated experience, and our 
interrelations with other living entities. Vulnerability theorists such as Martha Fineman 
argue that justice should be grounded in an understanding of the vulnerability of 
individuals embedded in nature rather than the invulnerable, fictitious Kantian subject 
of liberal legality (Fineman 2013).27 New materialist approaches seek to overturn the 
anthropocentrism-ecocentrism binary by problematizing nature in an immersive 
entanglement within “incalculable, interconnected material agencies that erode even our 
most sophisticated modes of understanding” (Alaimo 2010, p. 124). 
New materialism challenges a foundational myth of positive law, the notion that 
humans are the sole source of law because it disturbs “the conventional sense that agents 
are exclusively humans who possess cognitive abilities, intentionality and freedom to 
make autonomous decisions and the corollary presumption that humans have the 
right or ability to master nature” (Coole and Frost 2010, p. 10). As a consequence, the 
role of nature as a legal actor is rarely acknowledged despite the reality that biota, 
whether conscious or not, are continuously altering, becoming, shifting, striving 
(Bennett 2010) and interacting with human beings in ways that generate or modify law.28 
New materialist thinkers such as Bennett (2004, 2010), Braidotti (2006) and Barad (2007, 
2008) advance posthumanist, hybrid models in which humans share agency in relational 
assemblages (De Lucia 2013). Barad maintains that “phenomena are produced through 
complex intra-actions of multiple material-discursive apparatuses of bodily production” (Barad 
2001, 87; emphasis in original). Material entities not as ontologically discrete but 
constituted in contingent relations of entanglement. 
Matter is not immutable or passive. It does not require the mark of an external force like 
culture or history to complete it. Matter is always already an ongoing historicity . . . 
matter does not refer to a fixed substance; rather, matter is substance in its intra-active 
becoming - not a thing, but a doing, a congealing of agency. Matter is a stabilizing and 
destabilizing process of iterative intra-activity. (Barad 2003, p. 822) 
Thus, for Barad (2003, p. 826), “agency is cut loose from its traditional humanist orbit 
(…) [not] aligned with human intentionality or subjectivity” because other animate 
                                                 
27 This is consistent with the intrinsic postanthropocentric tendency in environmental studies to mutate into 
“neomaterialist variations” (Braidotti 2017, p. 84). 
28 Bonneuil and Fressoz (2016, p. 198) argue that the Anthropocene can equally be understood as the 
Agnotocene, the age of wilful ignorance. 
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organisms; material things; spaces and places and their surrounding natural and built 
environments; and material forces including gravity and time have agential capacities 
as well as human beings and the elements from which are comprised (Fox and Alldred 
2018). There is a similar spread of ontological types with agentic capacity or thing power 
in Bennett’s vital materialism (Bennett 2004), in which “[e]dibles, commodities, storms, 
and metals act as quasi agents, with their own trajectories, potentialities and tendencies” 
(Watson 2013, p. 147).29 It follows that “there are not organisms on one side and an 
environment on the other, but a coproduction by both. Agencies are redistributed” 
(Latour 2018, p. 76; emphasis in original). 
The onto-epistemological challenge is to conceive ourselves as critters open to new forms 
of hybridisation in human-non-human networks rather than as an exceptional, 
solipsistic species (Haraway 2016), and thereby to overturn the anthropocentricity of 
Eurocentric law and rationality.30 
Margaret Davies (2017) describes the corporeal impacts of climatic harms on humans 
embedded in natureculture,31 which produces the focus of new materialism: 
on situating the human, including human meaning and human subjectivity, in a 
material world where all matter, living and non-living, is related, where objects have 
their own vitality and resistance, and where agency emerges in relation rather than as 
an existing quality. (Davies 2017, p. 66) 
Materialist legal theory that takes the “living planet and its ecological characteristics 
seriously” in ways that IEL has failed to do because: 
Materialism foregrounds the undivided space of natureculture in which everything 
subsists – as with the material–discursive distinction with which it is related, nature–
culture collapses as a distinction when we see that existence is constituted by a highly 
mobile relationality between humans and the entire non-human world. (Davies 2017, 
p. 72) 
Critiques of new materialism range from pointing out its contradictions to outrage at its 
claims. Amongst the former is Arias-Maldonado (2015), who asks whether it is possible 
to reconcile the agential capacity of non-human actants with the primacy given to human 
beings in the Anthropocene? Do human cognition and consciousness place them at the 
apex of a hierarchy of agency despite their growing powerlessness? Amongst the latter, 
Malm (2018) furiously derides constructivist views about the death of nature. In Malm’s 
view, only conscious actors have agency (which is not certain for non-human actors) 
because acting in the absence of reasons is not real agency. Condemning Vogel’s (2015) 
literalist construction of nature as empirically false and Latour’s hybridism as another 
form of Cartesianism, Malm approvingly cites Soper’s realist definition of nature as 
“those material structures and processes that are independent of human activity (in the 
sense they are not a humanly created product) and whose forces and causal powers are 
                                                 
29 Vogel (2015) describes the intrinsic wildness of buildings that continually change in ways that escape 
human control. 
30 Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2011b) challenges the idea of the environment as a surrounding context 
with humans at its centre because there is no centre that can be occupied. Anthropocentric attempts to place 
humans at the centre are unsustainable in all senses of the word. 
31 The concept of natureculture is borrowed from Haraway (1997). It underpins an epistemology based upon 
the demolition of boundaries between animal and human, and the technological and the organic. 
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the necessary conditions of every human practice, and determine the possible forms it 
can take” (Soper 1995, pp. 132-3; emphasis added). The problem that Malm does not 
adequately address it that is difficult to identify any natural structures and processes 
unaffected by human activity or, in many cases, intensified by it. 
5. Conclusion 
The Anthropocene is the story – the geohistory – of an exceptional species increasingly 
disempowered by hubris, a tale about its escape from environmental determinism 
through telluric power that has summoned new forms of posthuman form 
environmental determinism which cannot be evaded. This trope simultaneously over-
estimates human’s ability to tame nature and diminishes their responsibility for seeking 
to do so. New materialism exposes the limits of this discourse by demonstrating the 
influence of non-human agents on natureculture, including law. It points to possibilities 
for posthuman ethics, politics and legal theory rooted in post-anthropocentric 
epistemologies of humility, care and stewardship informed by indigenous cosmologies 
and vulnerability theory – for a “relational ethics that values cross-species, transversal 
alliances with the productive and immanent force of zoe, or nonhuman life” (Braidotti 
2016, p. 23). New materialism challenges the assumption that humans are the exclusive 
originators of law rather than the co-construction of human and non-human networks 
in natureculture. 
Anna Grear (2017a, p. 92) argues that our understanding of environment and the 
grounds of environmental law’s ontology is destabilised when matter evades 
conventional categorisations and linear conceptions of causality. Grear argues that 
“foregrounding material factors and reconfiguring our very understanding of matter 
will necessarily transform law’s fundamental construct of ‘the environment’” (Ibid, p. 92; 
emphasis in original) if we respond to the urgent need to reconceptualise what it means 
to be human in a climate and ecological emergency. She argues that the decentred subject 
“presented with a demand for epistemic humility” and reconceived as an 
interdependent actant in a web of dependencies opens the path to a genuine ecological 
epistemology Grear (2017a, p. 93).32 
This is the path to a paradigm shift towards a materialist legal theory no longer trapped 
anthropocentric, binary, exclusionary, hierarchical thinking. Climate justice is impeded 
so long as law fails to acknowledge the ontological co-dependence of humans and nature 
and their interwoven wellbeing by incorporating the insights of Earth System science 
and the challenges of the Anthropocene-Capitalocene (Kotzé et al. 2021). Accepting the 
agentic capacities of non-human actants does not imply the abandonment of ethical 
responsibility. On the contrary, it calls for heightened awareness of the injustices that 
arise from unreflexive human agency, and new forms of responsibilisation in the form 
of a planetary ethics sensitive to our co-constitutive, inter-corporeal entanglements with 
non-human entities (Adelman 2020). New materialist reconceptualisations of matter, 
mattering and agency offer an expanded conception of justice in general and climate 
justice in particular. 
                                                 
32 On the shift to a radical ecological epistemology see Haraway 2008, pp. 3-4, 11. 
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The Covid-19 pandemic has laid bare the scale of the ideological breakdown of 
neoliberal models of development, its inadequacy in the face of an existential threat that 
it impels and multiplies, shown that economic, political and legal orthodoxies are neither 
natural nor inevitable, and that the future of humanity is our choice. To avoid relapsing 
into the abnormal, we must think differently because climate justice will not be delivered 
by business and law as usual. 
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